It should be noted, however, that a violation of Section 26 of the Indian Contract Act of 1872 was not invoked in apex Court by a partial restriction of marriage which, as part of the service contract, existed definitively before the Apex court. In the meantime, the judiciary has followed this interpretation and, therefore, any agreement to restrict marriage, in whole or in part, is annulled in India. This goes against English law, which allows agreements for partial withholding marriage. Under Section 26 of the Indian Contract Act, all agreements restricting marriage, with the exception of a minor, are unhinged. The Romans were the first to delegitimize agreements that respected marriage. The basis of the marriage limitation agreements, which are null and void, is that marriage is a sacrament and that nothing should encroach on the institution of marriage, not even treaties. The idea behind this provision is not to deprive everyone of the personal right to marry someone of their choice. It is important to note here that, according to the section, agreements limiting the marriage of a minor are not invalid. There are certain conditions that validate a restriction of trade in a sale of value, i.e.: (i) Any agreement to limit the marriage by another person, with the exception of a minor, is not valid. In this case, Thorsten Nordenfelt was a weapons manufacturer in Sweden and England. Thorsten sold his business to a company, which then sold the business to Maxim Nordenfelt. At that time, Thorsten entered into an agreement with Maxim that he would not engage in the manufacture of weapons for 25 years, except what he produced on behalf of the company.
Thorsten later broke his vows and said the agreement was unenforceable because he challenged the trade restriction. The court`s decision was made by Thorsten on the back foot. In the common law, a review of reason is followed. A commercial restriction was disputed when: Preliminary proceedings had established that such a practice existed and allowed the applicant to demand payment from the groom. However, a High Court chamber, in the second appeal, stated that such a payment of money for marriage to an adult woman was not applicable because it was immoral and contrary to public policy. In Venkatakrishnayya v. Lakshminarayana, the question was referred to Full Bench, if a contract to make a payment to the father given his birth of his daughter in marriage, should be considered immoral or contrary to public policy within the meaning of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Full Bench found that such a contract was immoral and contrary to public policy. The Full Bench dealt only with one case where it was a promise to the father to bring him into the marriage. The High Court expressed serious doubts as to whether Section 26 of the Contracts Act contained a partial or indirect restriction on marriage and was not persuaded by this argument. Chief Justice Ahmad delivered the verdict that was declared by the Supreme Court in that case, that the terms of an agreement should not be construed as preventing the other party from seeking appeal.
However, an agreement on marriage mediation is fundamentally different from a marriage restriction agreement, as it is necessarily an agreement with a third person, i.e.: